The New Face of the Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA's Proposed TMDL Rules by Boyd, James
The New Face of the Clean Water Act:












© 2000 Resources for the Future. All rights
reserved.
No portion of this paper may be reproduced
without permission of the authors.
Discussion papers are research materials
circulated by their authors for purposes of
information and discussion. They have not
undergone formal peer review or the editorial
treatment accorded RFF books and other




2. TMDL PROGRAM BACKGROUND....................................................................................3
2.1 The Clean Water Act’s Successes and Failures............................................................3
2.2 The Changing Politics of Water Quality.......................................................................6
2.3 Litigation ......................................................................................................................7
2.4  Brief Overview of the Proposed Rules........................................................................8
3.  COMPLETED TMDLS: AN ILLUSTRATION...................................................................10
3.1 Columbia Slough TMDLs ..........................................................................................10
3.1.1 How are water quality problems identified? ................................................10
3.1.2 How are sources and their contributions to impairment identified?.............11
3.1.3 How is responsibility for reductions determined?........................................13
3.1.4 How will implementation and enforcement of the TMDL be achieved?.....15
3.2 Other Examples ..........................................................................................................16
4.  LONG-RUN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM..................................................17
4.1 Federal Authority and Nonpoint Sources ...................................................................18
4.2 State Authority and Nonpoint Sources.......................................................................20
4.3 Best Management Practices as Enforceable Standards...............................................22
4.4 The Technical Basis for Listing Criteria and Load Modeling....................................24
4.5 Jurisdictional Conflicts...............................................................................................26
4.6 TMDLs and Water Quantity Law...............................................................................27
4.7 Offsets and the Location of Sources...........................................................................28
5.  ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND POLLUTANT TRADING..................................28
5.1 Trading under the Clean Water Act............................................................................29
5.2 The Barriers to Water Quality Trading.......................................................................30
5.3 Allocations, Baselines, and Liability..........................................................................33
6. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................341
THE NEW FACE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT:




The United States is on the brink of a new era in water quality regulation.
Proposed total maximum daily load (TMDL) rules are bringing to life a long-dormant
approach to the identification, prioritization, and repair of the nation’s polluted waters
that promises to expand the gains in water quality secured by the Clean Water Act’s
(CWA) first 25 years.
1 Despite progress under the act, pollution or some form of habitat
degradation continues to afflict 36% of surveyed river miles.
2 Moreover, of the nation’s
impaired rivers and streams, fewer than 10% are impaired primarily or secondarily by
industrial point sources the act’s principal early target for pollution reductions along
with municipal sewage treatment. These stark realities as well as an abundance of
litigation directed at the agency have prompted the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to explore the potential of the CWA’s section 303(d) to promote a wide
variety of new actions to protect the nation’s waters.
Long-neglected but always a part of the CWA, section 303(d) requires states to
identify waters that are not in compliance with water quality standards, establish
priorities, and implement improvements. In 1996, the EPA convened a Federal Advisory
Committee, which culminated in a 1998 report and subsequent proposed rules for
implementation of the TMDL program and associated changes in the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) for point sources.
3
As the proposed rules explain, “the TMDL specifies the amount of a particular
pollutant that may be present in a waterbody, allocates allowable pollutant loads among
sources, and provides the basis for attaining or maintaining water quality standards.”
 4
Within this description lies a significant shift in the way water quality is regulated.
Instead of the technology-based, end-of-pipe approach to point sources that has
                                                     
* Fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington DC, 20036 (boyd@rff.org).
1 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. For 1977 amendments to the act, see Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
2 According to states’ 1996 reporting under §305(b) of the CWA. National Water Quality Inventory: 1996
Report to Congress, EPA841-F-97-003, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, April
1998. Summarized in EPA documents available at www.epa.gov/ow/resources/9698.
3 Respectively, Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL
Program, EPA 100-R-98-006, July 1998 (hereafter FAC); 40 CFR Part 130, Proposed Revisions to the
Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation; Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg., August 23, 1999,
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characterized CWA enforcement to date, the TMDL program promises an “ambient”
approach to water monitoring and standards. That is, instead of focusing on releases from
known sources of water pollution (i.e., monitoring discharges from discrete, identifiable
pollution sources), regulation and reporting will increasingly be concerned with the in
situ quality of waterbodies themselves. While this sounds like simple common sense, it
should be emphasized that an ambient approach to water quality enforcement is largely
untried.
5 For a variety of mostly pragmatic reasons, federal and state programs have
focused on the regulation of point sources via technology-based standards to secure
effluent reductions. But the low-hanging fruit of low-cost, high-volume point source
reductions has largely been harvested. Today, significant water quality improvement
implies the expansion of controls to nonpoint sources of pollution.
While the proposed TMDL rules have significant implications for point sources, it
is the impact on nonpoint source regulation that is the TMDL program's most important
characteristic. Because ambient monitoring will find a large number of the nation’s
waterbodies to be impaired, and because nonpoint sources are a primary cause of that
impairment, TMDLs will change the politics, economics, and implementation of water
quality regulation.
This paper provides a description and critical review of the EPA’s proposed
TMDL rules. The analysis is not critical of the overall movement toward this type of
regulatory approach. In fact, TMDL-based rules should be thought of as an inevitable
step toward a mature phase of regulation in which all sources of water quality
degradation are addressed. However, the review is critical in the sense that it takes a
sober view of the significant challenges facing regulators. After all, there is a reason
nonpoint sources have largely escaped regulation over the last 25 years. Federal authority
to mandate nonpoint source controls remains weak. Implementation of the analytic tools
required by the TMDL process will be costly and difficult. And conflicts are almost
certain to arise due to the geographically interrelated nature of pollution sources and legal
jurisdictions. Also, the new rules explicitly create incentives for pollutant trading across
point sources and nonpoint sources. According to one of the new rules, “EPA is seeking
to establish a market for pollutant trading, in the hopes of creating more effective and
efficient mechanisms for restoring water quality.”
6 While laudable as a means to promote
flexible, cost-effective discharge controls, water quality trading should properly be
viewed as a tall order with numerous barriers to implementation.
The paper does not address the debate over the CWA’s net social benefits.
7
Rather, the paper takes the CWA’s legal requirements as given and considers the
                                                     
5 Interestingly, however, statutory approaches that pre-date the Clean Water Act, such as the Water Quality
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economic implications of movement toward a TMDL-driven regulatory system.  In
addition to an overview of current water quality conditions, Section 2 sets out the history
of the TMDL program’s development, and offers a brief description of the proposed
rules. Section 3 details TMDLs that have been completed. Section 4 explores a set of
legal and economic challenges presented by the program’s future implementation and
makes some recommendations for the ways in which the program can be made most
effective. Section 5 considers the difficulties associated with water quality trading.
Section 6 offers a general set of conclusions based on the paper’s analysis of the TMDL
program.
2. TMDL PROGRAM BACKGROUND
The way water quality priorities are identified, the way responsibility for
improvements is assigned, and the economic, political, and practical challenges of
implementation are all changing. The history of Clean Water Act implementation both
its successes and failures  helps to explain why the TMDL program’s time has come.
2.1 The Clean Water Act’s Successes and Failures
Within 10 years of the Clean Water Act’s passage, significant improvements in
water quality were being reported by water scientists and regulators. An analysis of
changes in water quality over the period 1974 to 1981 documented widespread reductions
in lead and fecal bacteria concentrations, a reduction in industrial and municipal
biological oxygen demand loads of 71% and 46%, respectively, and some geographically
focused improvements in measures of dissolved oxygen deficit.
8 To put the
accomplishment in better perspective, these gains came during a period when inflation-
adjusted GNP increased 25% . The gains were largely due to CWA-related expenditures
on the improvement of municipal sewage treatment. Between 1970 and 1985 the fraction
of U.S. population served by wastewater treatment jumped from 42% to 74%.
9
In addition to improvements in municipal wastewater treatment, technology-based
standards for industrial point sources began to yield large improvements. Starting in the
early 1980s, point sources have had to meet effluent limits consistent with a variety of
technology-based standards such as “best available technology economically
achievable.”
10 Establishment of the NPDES permitting system has brought reporting,
penalty, and anti-backsliding provisions to the regulatory scheme. Complementing this
federal permit authority, section 505 of the CWA enables citizens to file suit for
compliance with NPDES permits or EPA orders.
11 Together, these enforcement tools
                                                     
8 Richard Smith, Richard Alexander, and M.Gordon Wolman, Water Quality Trends in the Nation's Rivers.
235 Science 1607, 1987.
9 World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-1993, 1992, 167.
10 Compliance was phased in over a period of years, with the timing depending on the source category and
effluent classification.
11 The CWA’s citizen suit provisions are thought to have been particularly effective, at least relative to their
use under other statutes. See Charles Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forest: How the Citizen Suit
Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution’s Separation of Powers Principle, 81 Virginia
Law Review 1957, 1995. For a more critical view of penalties under the CWA, see Robert Adler, Jessica
Landman, and Diane Cameron, The Clean Water Act 20 Years Later, Natural Resources Defense Council,
1993, 166-170. And see Michael Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard James Boyd Discussion Paper 00-12
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have precipitated significant reductions in industrial point source releases. For instance,
between 1987 and 1990 toxic discharges to surface water fell from 417 to 197 million lbs
per year, according to Toxics Release Inventory data.
12 By setting limits on the discharge
of more than 60 pollutants, including organic pollutants and heavy metals, the EPA
Office of Water currently estimates that the program reduces conventional pollutant
discharges by 108 million lbs and toxic discharges by 24 million lbs annually.
13 A rough,
but illustrative, benchmark of these collective improvements is offered by the EPA:
In 1972, most estimates were that only 30 to 40 percent of assessed waters met
water quality goals such as being safe for fishing and swimming. Today, state
monitoring data indicate that between 60 to 70 percent of assessed waters meet state
water quality goals.
14
  At least an academic consensus exists that the CWA is one of the environmental
movement’s success stories, owing to its capacity to motivate point source controls.
15 But
to say that the CWA has improved water quality is not to say that further efforts are not
indicated. In fact, the nation’s waters remain significantly polluted.
16
A corollary to the CWA’s achievements is the sobering fact that 30% to 40% of
waters still fail to meet state standards. More specifically, according to the latest National
Water Quality Inventory, 36% of the rivers and streams surveyed were partially or fully
impaired, and water quality is “threatened” in an additional 8%. Of the surveyed lakes,
39% were partially or fully impaired, with water quality threatened in an additional 10%.
Of surveyed estuaries, 38% are reported to be partially or fully impaired, with water
quality threatened in an additional 4%.
17 Casting the data somewhat differently, the states
have identified more than 20,000 individual river segments, lakes, and estuaries as
polluted. This amounts to 300,000 miles of river and 5 million acres of lakes classified as
polluted.
18
The data strongly suggest that improvements in water quality have been
disproportionately due to point source regulation. Recognition is now widespread that
nonpoint sources are of principal concern. Consider the EPA’s most recent ranking of
sources contributing to water quality impairment:
                                                                                                                                                             
Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 Ecology Law Quarterly 393, 1997 (for an analysis of
whether citizen suits are available in the context of water-quality-based CWA violations, rather than
permitting violations).
12 The study in which these figures are cited is highly critical, however, of the implementation of point
source regulations under the CWA. Cited in Adler, Landman, and Cameron, supra note 11,at 18.
13 U.S. EPA Clean Water Successes and Challenges, at http://www.cleanwater.gov/action/c1a.html.
14 Ibid.
15 Drew Caputo, A Job half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 ELR 10574, November
1997; Robert Percival (ed), Alan Miller, and Christopher Schroeder, Environmental Regulation: Law,
Science, and Policy (Little, Brown & Co., 1996).
16 When it comes to overall water quality and the water-quality-based regulations in the CWA, critics can
be quite blunt: “evaluated from a variety of perspectives, the enforcement of the water quality-based system
of pollution control must be viewed as a failure.” Michael Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years:
Water Quality Standard Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 Ecology Law Quarterly 393.
17 National Water Quality Inventory, supra, note 2. The surveys covered 19% of all stream miles, 40% of
all lake acres, and 72% of all estuarine waters.
18 U.S. EPA, Office of Water, Overview of the TMDL Program, www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/tmdlfs.html. James Boyd Discussion Paper 00-12
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Rank Rivers Lakes Estuaries
1 Agriculture Agriculture Industrial discharges




3 Hydrologic modification Atmospheric deposition Municipal point
sources
4 Habitat modification Urban runoff/
storm sewers
Upstream sources
5 Resource extraction Municipal point sources Agriculture
Source: The Quality of Our Nation’s Water, Overview of States §305(b) water quality reporting for the year
1996, U.S. EPA, p. 13.
Industrial sources, while present on this list, clearly do not predominate. Instead, a host of
nonpoint sources, in particular from urban and agricultural runoff, loom large.
19
Pesticide, fertilizer, and animal waste runoff from agriculture is the single largest
contributor to the impairment of rivers and lakes. The private incentive of agriculture to
ensure the largest yields via perhaps excessive application of pesticides and fertilizers is a
classic example of an environmental externality, since much of the application inevitably
migrates into common resource waterbodies. Logging and construction activities, many
of them on federal lands, are a significant source of sediment contamination, as runoff
carries fine-grained soils from roads and construction sites into lakes and streams. In
urban and suburban areas, watershed degradation is closely tied to increased population
density and residential and commercial development. In such areas the relatively
impermeable nature of groundcover leads to rapid, unfiltered runoff from roadways and
parking lots, chemically treated lawns, and commercial establishments.
20 Increased
attention is also being given to atmospheric deposition, where pollutants from airborne
dust and industrial and commercial air emissions are absorbed by surface waters or
precipitated via rainfall.
21 In the Northwest, elevated water temperatures are having a
negative impact on cold-water salmon habitat.
22 Finally, legacy pollution (i.e., pollution
no longer being discharged) that has collected in sediments is a significant source of
ongoing waterbody impairment.
23
                                                     
19 In common parlance, pollution from nonpoint sources is “runoff caused primarily by rainfall around
activities that employ or cause pollutants.” United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368,373 (10th Cir.
1979).
20 Compare the “rainfall allocation” for natural and urban groundcover. With natural groundcover,
approximately 40% evaporates, 50% infiltrates the soil, and 10% runs off. In an urban setting 30%
evaporates, 15% infiltrates, and 55% runs off. Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission, Urban
Stormwater Best Management Practices for Northeastern Illinois, (Northeastern Illinois Planning
Commission: Chicago, IL) 1993.
21 The proposed rules explicitly include atmospheric deposition as a nonpoint source of pollutants. CFR1,
46016.
22 Water temperature is viewed as a component of overall water quality. Environment Reporter,
Temperature Becoming Larger Issue for Northwest Dischargers, Official Says, August 20, 1999, p. 795.
23 EPA estimates that 10% of the nation's lakes, rivers, and bays have sediment contaminated with toxic
chemicals that can kill fish living in those waters or impair the health of people and wildlife who eat James Boyd Discussion Paper 00-12
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One of the reasons these sources are such a significant problem is that they
present serious implementation, monitoring, and enforcement challenges. But the water
quality problems they cause can no longer be ignored, particularly given the significant
reductions already secured from point sources.
24 In this context, it is not surprising that
political and legal pressure is being applied to the EPA, and in turn to the states, to make
something of the regulatory potential contained in the CWA’s TMDL provisions.
2.2 The Changing Politics of Water Quality
The seeds of this shift in regulatory emphasis have been in place since the act’s
passage in 1972. Within section 303 lie provisions that call for an ambient-water-quality-
driven (rather than end-of-pipe) approach to enforcement. The section calls upon the
states to identify waters for which the point source controls elsewhere in the act “are not
stringent enough to implement any water quality standard applicable to such waters.”
25
States must prioritize any waters so identified, based on analysis of use and severity of
degradation, and establish total maximum daily pollutant loads sufficient to bring the
waters into compliance.
Section 303 provisions were largely ignored by states and the federal government
during the first two decades of CWA enforcement.
26 But nonattainment of water quality
goals and the desire to bring more sources into the regulated sphere has led to a
reexamination of the latent enforcement power contained in section 303. The importance
of the section is, first, that it requires state-wide assessments and public documentation of
water quality problems. As the public becomes aware of the “impaired” nature of the
waters around their communities, this reporting alone will provide a motivation for state
regulatory efforts. Second, the TMDLs themselves appear, at least in principle, to imply
that states must allocate pollutant load reductions to sources not currently covered by
load restrictions. Since load reductions have been wrung from point sources over a period
of 25 years, and since the bulk of current impairment is caused by nonpoint sources, any
state seeking further load reductions at least on a cost-benefit basis will be led directly
to nonpoint sources. In this way, the shift to ambient monitoring and standards almost
necessarily leads to a greater emphasis on nonpoint sources.
Enforcement of section 303 clearly alters the politics of load reduction. The need
to meet in situ water quality standards sets up a state-by-state confrontation between
well-organized industrial interests who can claim to have already paid their pollution
control dues and organized agricultural, silvicultural, and municipal interests who resist
the “expansion” of CWA-driven requirements to their hard-to-solve nonpoint problems.
An industrial and municipal constituency for nonpoint source controls can already be
                                                                                                                                                             
contaminated fish. Listing of Fish and Wildlife Consumption Advisories, EPA 823-C-97-004, 1997; The
Incidence and Severity of Sediment Contamination in Surface Water of the United States, EPA 823-R-97-
006, 007, 008, 1998).
24 In the words of one observer, “unless TMDLs include quantified restrictions on nonpoint sources, they
are wasting everyone’s time.” Oliver Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet? The Long Road Toward Water
Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ELR News and Analysis 10391, July 1997,
10401.
25 33 U.S.C. §1313(d).
26 For a detailed analysis of the history of the section 303 provisions in the context of the CWA’s overall
implementation, see Houck, supra note 24 and Oliver Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality
Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ELR News and Analysis 10329, August 1997. James Boyd Discussion Paper 00-12
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detected. According to the Director of the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage
Agencies, “In the absence of nonpoint source controls, all these criteria drive tighter
standards. All that’s left is tighter limits on permits.”
27 This scenario is obviously of great
concern to current point source permit holders. A minority (dissenting) contribution to
the Federal Advisory Committee Report by a municipality representative and industrial
source representative echoed the worry saying, “It is patently unfair to encourage states to
impose further burdens on point sources merely because of the absence of federal
enforcement authority over nonpoint sources.”
28
The EPA’s authority to implement the new TMDL and NPDES permitting rules is
not accepted by all parties. Even if the new rules are successfully promulgated, many
opponents will not accept the changes quietly. Following rule publication, members of a
House subcommittee criticized the EPA for not requesting Congress to enact authorizing
legislation in support of the TMDL program.
29 Some agricultural interests argue that the
proposed TMDL rules “illegally link nonpoint source runoff to the federally dictated and
enforceable TMDL program” by reading the CWA to cover only waters impaired by
point sources.
30 The EPA’s position is that the CWA provides ample authority for the
proposed TMDL rules. Within the proposed rules themselves, the EPA counters the
argument that the agency has no authority to regulate nonpoint sources. “Section 319, a
section that exclusively addresses nonpoint sources, provides clear evidence that
Congress did not intend to limit the term ‘pollutant’ to point sources.”
31 If a state fails to
impose controls over an operation that is the source of an ongoing water impairment, the
agency contends that the CWA provides it with authority to step in and issue Best
Management Practices (BMPs) or other controls to reduce nonpoint pollution.
32
2.3 Litigation
The direct impetus for the new focus on section 303 was a series of court cases,
beginning in the late 1980s that challenged the EPA’s oversight of the states’
responsibilities. Until very recently, most states had failed to submit their assessments of
polluted waters (if those assessments even existed at all), and had therefore failed to
engage in the prioritization of waters for cleanup, promulgation of TMDLs, and
implementation of associated discharge controls called for under section 303. The history
of this litigation has been usefully summarized by EPA itself, and by others.
33 Currently,
                                                     
27 Chances for Clean Water Bill Dim; EPA to Use Existing Authorities on Nonpoint Sources, Environment
Reporter, Jan 22, 1999, S-18-19.
28 FAC, I-4.
29 House Panel Members Question EPA Authority to Issue TMDL Proposal, Environment Reporter,
November 5, 1999, p. 1241.
30 This argument was presented in a memorandum to the Office of Management and Budget from the
National Pork Producers Council, the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, and the American Crop
Protection Association, reported in Waters Impaired By Nonpoint Sources Would Be Listed, Draft TMDL
Rule Says, Environment Reporter, p. 520, July 16, 1999.
31 CFR1, 46021. Federal authority over nonpoint sources is analyzed in more detail in section 4.1 infra.
32 Testimony of Chuck Fox, EPA assistant administrator for water, cited in Environment Reporter, note 29
supra.
33 See www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/lawsuit1.html and Houck, supra, note 26. According to Houck, the states
“By and large, did not do anything called for under §303(d)…They did not do it in the 1970s. They did not
do it in the 1980s. They did not do it at the outset of the 1990s, nor did EPA until a series of citizen suits
rocked EPA and the states into a hasty rereading of §303(d) and the current scramble to comply,” 10344. James Boyd Discussion Paper 00-12
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the EPA is under court order in 17 states to establish TMDLS if the states fail to do so. In
14 other states litigation has been filed (or notice has been given of intent to file) seeking
to compel EPA establishment of TMDLs.
34
The Federal Advisory Committee and the proposed rules should be viewed as a
direct outgrowth of this litigation.
35 The litigation has also had an immediate effect on
state assessments and reporting of impaired waters. Idaho Sportsmen’s Coalition v.
Browner is illustrative.
36 As of 1989, Idaho had submitted no list of “water quality
limited segments” (WQLSs). As of 1992 the state had a list, but one with only 36 listed
WQLSs. Using a “constructive submission” theory, the court found the EPA’s approval
of Idaho’s compliance with section 303 to be arbitrary and contrary to law. Under court
order, the EPA has since approved a list identifying 962 Idaho WQLSs. All states and
territories have now at least submitted a list, with full EPA approval secured by 38
states.
37
2.4  Brief Overview of the Proposed Rules
The proposed revisions to the EPA’s TMDL rules provide more specificity and
structure to the operation of the program. The rules lay out a basic set of requirements for
the states, including:
•  Which waters are listed. While it is largely up to an individual state to determine
which waters are impaired, the rules require public review of the procedures by
which a state arrives at its list. And EPA has final approval authority over listings
and the methodologies used to derive them. According to the rules, the EPA’s view
is that “the section 303(d) list should serve as a comprehensive public accounting of
all waterbodies impaired or threatened by pollution and pollutants, irrespective of the
tool or mechanism being used to achieve standards.”
38
•  A format for listing and the assignment of priorities. The states are required to
rank waters by their degree of impairment and to assign waters on the list to
categories that reflect their priority and progress toward meeting standards. Impaired
waterbodies designated as public drinking water supplies and those posing a threat to
species listed under the Endangered Species Act, must be designated a high
priority.
39 Apart from that, the states are allowed discretion, subject to federal
                                                     
34 Cases establishing the failure of a state to meaningfully or fully submit the required 303(d) lists and need
to develop TMDLs include Northwest Environmental Defense Center, et. al. v. EPA, No. 85-1578 (D.Ore.);
Alaska Center for the Environment v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994); Sierra Club, et al. v.
Hankinson, 939 F.Supp 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996). Consent decrees or settlement agreements include Pacific
Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations, et al. v. Marcus, et al., No. 95-4474 MHP (N.D. Calif.);
American Littoral Society, et al. v. EPA, No. 96-489 (E.D. Pa.); Defenders of Wildlife, et al. v. Browner, et
al., No. 93-234 TUC ACM (D.Ariz.).
35 Note 3 supra.
36 951 F.Supp. 962, 964 (W.D. Washington 1996) (describing the case’s procedural history).
37 It is important to note that these are lists of impaired waters, not the states’ final TMDL plans.
38 CFR1, 46025. States have latitude to determine the geographic scope of a waterbody or segment that is
listed. Listing can relate to an entire basin or individual stream segments. There is a tradeoff here. Too large
an area may overwhelm the regulator’s ability to monitor, evaluate, and implement a plan effectively. Too
small an area may fail to account for all of the sources contributing to the problem.
39 CFR1, 46026. James Boyd Discussion Paper 00-12
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oversight. A range of factors may be considered in the development of the priority
rankings. “These factors include immediate programmatic needs, vulnerability of
particular waterbodies as aquatic habitats, recreational, economic and aesthetic
importance of particular waterbodies, degree of public interest and support, and
State, Territorial, authorized Tribal, or national policies and priorities.”
40
• Timelines. States are required to establish TMDLs for all waterbodies within 15
years. TMDLs for waterbodies listed as “high priority” must be established first, and
states are “encouraged” to develop TMDLs for such waters within 5 years of listing.
• The implementation of TMDLs themselves. All TMDLs must identify the
pollutants contributing to impairment and establish the load reductions necessary to
bring the water into compliance, including a margin of safety. The TMDL must
identify pollutant sources, including nonpoint sources. And the TMDL must feature
an implementation plan, with a list and timeline for actions, including monitoring
and verification of compliance. The implementation plan also includes an
“allocation” of load reductions to different sources. Local conditions ecological,
political, and economic will be allowed to determine the nature of the allocation.
According to the rule, TMDLs “provide for tradeoffs between alternative point and
nonpoint source control options so that cost effectiveness, technical effectiveness,
and the social and economic benefits of different allocations can be considered by
decision-makers.”
41
State-level TMDL development, particularly the allocation of load reductions, is likely to
spur a host of innovative approaches to pollutant load reductions by drawing new sources
and trading mechanisms into new control systems. But to complement this “many flowers
will bloom” flexibility, the proposed rules codify a set of requirements meant to
guarantee meaningful and comparable state initiatives.
The proposed TMDL rules are also accompanied by proposed changes to the
NPDES permitting system for point sources.
•  New point source offset requirements. During the period (perhaps 20 years or
more) until TMDL benefits can be fully realized, the new rules seek net reductions
in point source discharges to impaired waterbodies. The proposed rules require all
“large” new dischargers and existing dischargers undergoing a “significant”
expansion in discharges on impaired waterbodies to offset the new discharges, by an
amount equal to 150% of the new discharge.
42
• Expansion of point source designation. In order to expand its authority to
previously unregulated sources, the EPA proposes to designate large animal feeding,
aquatic animal production, and certain forestry operations as point sources. Thus
                                                     
40 CFR1, 46025.
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42 CFR2, 46059. And see discussion, note 154 infra. James Boyd Discussion Paper 00-12
10
classified, these facilities would fall under NPDES permit requirements.
43 This
reclassification is expected to increase from 2,000 to 20,000 the number of feedlot
operations alone that are required to secure permit approval.
44
These rules are analyzed in more detail below. While still in a proposal and
comment phase, and with significant implementation questions remaining, the rules
should nevertheless be recognized as a significant new development in the nation’s
approach to water quality improvement.
3.  COMPLETED TMDLS: AN ILLUSTRATION
In response to the threat of legal action or court orders, a number of states have
moved forward with the development of loading standards for priority impaired water
segments.
45  To illustrate the components and practical implications of a TMDL analysis
and plan,
46 the Columbia Slough TMDLs are described here, though they should not be
viewed as necessarily representative of TMDLs generally. The problems and solutions
identified in TMDL planning are highly idiosyncratic. The Columbia Slough case was
selected for description, however, because it involves a complex set of impairments and
includes detailed analysis and concrete implementation plans by the state. In fact, the
Columbia Slough TMDLs are notably specific in their description of the enforcement and
implementation tools that will be called upon to achieve water quality improvements.
3.1 Columbia Slough TMDLs
Once impairments are identified through the listing process, TMDL planning
turns to the identification of pollutant sources, the allocation of responsibility for source
reductions, and implementation and enforcement of the allocations. These steps are
illustrated in turn.
Columbia Slough is a roughly 19-mile-long collection of mostly shallow water
channels located on the Columbia River’s floodplain near Portland. A variety of land
uses industrial, residential, and agricultural occurs in the 40,000 acre area that drains
into the slough. The geographic scope of the TMDLs was determined largely by
hydrological characteristics, such as drainage areas and tidal flows. EPA approved the
TMDLs for Columbia Slough in November 1998.
3.1.1 How are water quality problems identified?
The first step in the TMDL process is listing a waterbody as impaired. This
process identifies by category the cause of impairment (e.g., excessive algae or lead) and
compares existing conditions to the relevant water quality standard. Impairment is
                                                     
43 CFR2, 46074-78. The authority to reclassify pollution sources under the CWA resides with the EPA,
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established in reference to criteria established and documented by the state.
47 These
criteria describe the standards for each category of impairment, the data to be used, and
guidelines to ensure the quality of data analysis.
48
As an example, consider the state’s framework for determining a chlorophyll a
impairment. The beneficial uses affected by impairment include water-contact recreation,
aesthetics, fishing, water supply, and livestock watering. The standards are expressed as
numeric concentrations (e.g., mg/l).
49 Water quality is considered limited, and thus
subject to listing, if the three-month average exceeds the numeric standard.
50 Data used
for the 1998 listing of waterbodies come from a variety of sources, including the Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) itself, as well as contractors and federal
agencies. Standards and data vary by pollutant. For example, fish or shellfish
consumption advisories issued by the Oregon State Health Division are used to indicate
impairment due to toxic pollutants.
51
The Columbia Slough was placed on the Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality’s 303(d) list because of a variety of impairments. The slough was found to be in
violation of standards for chlorophyll a, dissolved oxygen, pH, phosphorus, bacteria, and
a range of toxic pollutants, including lead, dioxin, and PCBs [I wouldn’t] . These
pollutants individually threaten one or more beneficial uses of the waterbody including
recreational fishing, boating, swimming, or support of aquatic life. Water column, fish
tissue, and sediment data were used to identify the slough as impaired. The data came
from a variety of sources, including metropolitan agencies, the City of Portland Bureau of
Environmental Services, Portland State University, and the EPA. Historically, monitoring
of the waterbody has been conducted only “sporadically,” according to the DEQ.
52
The Columbia Slough case highlights the value of the listing process alone. As of
1998, Portland residents could look to a readily available state analysis of a waterbody,
which lies in close proximity and provides them with a range of recreational, aesthetic,
and commercial values. That the waterbody suffers from ten distinct forms of impairment
is an easily comprehended and presumably politically salient piece of information.
53
Moreover, the listing process itself promotes higher quality and more consistent data
collection and analysis.
3.1.2 How are sources and their contributions to impairment identified?
Once they have knowledge of impairment, states must design TMDLs that
provide a defensible plan for source reductions to bring the affected waterbody into
attainment. The development of TMDLs requires knowledge of sources and the pathways
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by which pollutants are transported and deposited in the waterbody. Identification of
sources and pathways requires a kind of holistic accounting exercise. To construct a
source inventory, states typically will survey permitted sources (industrial and municipal
point sources) and inventory land uses in the affected waterbody’s drainage area to
identify nonpoint sources, such as agricultural and urban runoff. In some cases, source
identification requires the equivalent of detective work in order to connect ambient
conditions with specific sources. As an example, severe oxygen depletion was detected in
the Columbia Slough following a large winter storm. This finding suggested that a source
of impairment was airplane de-icing chemicals that ran into the slough from Portland
International Airport. In another case, elevated bacteria levels “substantially higher than
those predicted via modeling” have directed attention toward the detection of illicit
discharges.
54
In addition to source identification, the development of a TMDL must be based on
the estimate of the effect of source reductions and other control activities on water
quality. In some cases, this process is straightforward. For example, an already permitted
point source may discharge directly into the waterbody. If so, the source, transport, and
deposition mechanism and contribution to loadings in the receiving waterbody are
already known. In general, however, TMDLs will be geared toward waterbodies with
multiple sources that migrate and enter the waterbody via a diverse set of pathways.
Understanding the contribution of a particular source to loadings in this more general set
of cases is a significant technical challenge.
Sources of impairment in the Columbia Slough include a complex mix of sewer
overflows, urban runoff, landfill leachate, industrial discharges, sediments, and
agricultural runoff. The complexity of making source determinations is compounded by a
variety of interactions between ground and surface water, weather events, temperature,
and water quality.
55 For this reason source contributions are rarely known with certainty.
Instead, the regulator must rely on models that attempt to capture the factors that affect
the transport, deposition, and ultimate fate of pollutants in the waterbody.
The models used are determined by the type of data available and the nature of
the system being described. For instance, stormwater discharges can be monitored for
lead. Such monitoring provides a rough gauge of the amount of lead deposition
attributable to urban runoff. In turn, contributions to urban runoff by categories of
sources can be estimated via modeling. Concretely, the land area in the drainage area
occupied by industrial facilities or roadways can be used to estimate the fraction of lead
runoff due to those sources. The Columbia Slough TMDL includes a particularly detailed
analysis of lead loadings. Individual industrial, stormwater, and sewer point source
permit holders are identified and their lead discharges assessed. In addition, there is
analysis of lead contributions by land use category. For each category, including
residential, industrial, commercial, parks, and traffic corridor, the land area is provided
and estimates of the lead load (in pounds per year is estimated).
56 Consider the model
used to calculate these loads for a single land use category:
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The contribution of lead from permitted industrial sites is calculated using the
following equation: (Area x Annual Rainfall x Runoff Coefficient x Pollutant
Concentration = Annual Pollutant Load). The annual rainfall for the watershed is
given in Table 3-12 of the Portland MS4 permit application as 34.3 inches per
year, and the runoff coefficient for industrial areas is given in Table 3-13 as
0.68.
57
The example highlights the data requirements and assumptions that go into the
calculation of a single number in a single analysis that is a component of a much larger
evaluation of sources and relative pollutant contributions.
The modeling techniques and data required for TMDL implementation pose a
significant challenge. Accordingly, they also contribute significantly to the costs of
implementation.
58 Some simplicity and cost savings will undoubtedly be possible as
states become more practiced in TMDL development and as more resources are
devoted to the development of data and models for use in this kind of program. However,
the degree to which data sources and modeling techniques can be standardized is limited.
Each listed water segment is in some sense unique, for example, in its hydrology,
transport pathways, pollutant sources, and so forth. TMDL development will invariably
involve some site-specific analysis (even if the point of the analysis is simply to show
that some set of standard data and techniques is applicable to the waterbody).
As an example of the site-specific nature of analysis, consider the Columbia
Slough TMDL’s approach to excessive nutrient loadings. Because “point source loads are
minor”
59 the search for source reductions involves groundwater controls, such as the
installation of sanitary sewers. However, because the effect of these reductions is much
delayed and “uncertain,”
60 the plan calls for changes in channel and stream flow. The
recommended changes are based on a site-specific analysis of natural flows, temperature,
time of year, and expected algae growth and flow management techniques available in
the drainage area. The applicability of “general” modeling techniques to this kind of
problem is limited.
For the Columbia Slough, the extent of documentation related to data and analysis
and methods is exemplary, as is the sophistication of the analysis itself. In turn, however,
the volume and complexity of the modeling techniques imply an equally complex array
of simplifying assumptions and potential shortcomings. In general, the TMDL process
highlights data limitations and our ignorance of the physical, chemical, and ecological
factors that determine the fate of pollutants.
3.1.3 How is responsibility for reductions determined?
Having determined the contribution of categories of sources to impairment, the
TMDL must assign load “allocations” (divisions of responsibility for reductions) that are
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expected to bring the waterbody into compliance. In the case of some, though not
necessarily all sources, these allocations will imply reductions in current discharges.
Thus, the allocations determine responsibility for the technological or land management
changes that will lead to improvements. For example, a currently discharging source, if
allocated a zero wasteload, must totally eliminate its discharges.
In some cases the allocation is assigned to specific sources, in others to general
categories such as a type of land use. Not surprisingly, allocations to specific sources
tend be directed at point sources and general allocations directed toward to nonpoint
sources. As in the determination of sources, the allocation process often involves a
quantitative modeling exercise. Modeling is used to estimate the impact of a load
reduction from a particular source on the receiving waterbody. Models may also be used
to predict how changes in land use brought on by economic growth will add to the waste
load.
61
Consider the allocations used to reduce biological oxygen demand (BOD) in the
Columbia Slough. Recall that the two primary sources contributing to the oxygen deficit
are Portland International Airport and urban runoff. Oregon allocated responsibility for
reductions by considering the relative baseline contributions to the oxygen deficit. These
relative contributions were determined, via modeling, to be 3.8 lbs of BOD airport load
for every pound of urban runoff load. This ratio provided the basis for the allocation of
reductions. Within these broad categories further divisions were made. For de-icing, 89%
was assigned to the airport and the remaining 11% to the Oregon National Guard. For
urban runoff, 46% was assigned to permitted stormwater dischargers and the remainder
to future growth and nonpermitted sources.
62 In the course of the public comment
process, the allocation was explained as follows: “DEQ … feels that allocations based on
the relative contributions of the pollutant is appropriate for a situation in which one
source causes most of the water quality impairment.”
63 Note that the rationale for the
allocation makes no reference to the costs of discharge controls. Instead, equity seems to
be the underlying motivation. No explicit rationale need be, or is, given.
Allocations are also motivated by pragmatism. In several cases, the permitted (or
allowed) allocation is equal to the baseline contribution of a source, implying no need for
source reductions. These examples include “upstream” sources of bacteria (which,
because they are upstream, are not controllable by this particular TMDL)
64 and
atmospheric deposition of lead (uncontrollable for similar reasons).
65 Interestingly,
specific point sources are in some cases also exempt from load reductions. This is true
presumably because point sources are already subject to “best available” controls on
releases. For example, a landfill generating lead-contaminated leachate was not required
to achieve reductions in excess of its baseline allocation.
Discharge reductions in Columbia Slough are to come from a variety of sources.
For bacteria, reductions come from the elimination of combined sewer overflow (CSO)
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discharges
66 and the elimination of illegal raw sewage sources. Both received a load
allocation of zero.
67 The primary reductions in lead loadings are allocated to sources of
urban runoff. These reductions are to come from changes in industrial stormwater permits
and implementation of best management practices (BMPs) applied to commercial,
industrial, and traffic corridor land uses.
68 For nutrients, reductions from a single
agricultural point source and drainage district water flow management changes are
required. Direct reduction in organic contaminants (such as DDT and Dioxin) are not
possible since these pollutants are no longer being released. Instead, the TMDL focuses
on erosion in the drainage area. Stormwater transport of contaminated sediment is the
primary transport and deposition mechanism. The stormwater allocation is reduced.
Moreover, of the total organic allocation, 33% is devoted to future growth, since
construction promotes erosion and is expected to increase loads. Reductions are to be
achieved through implementation of erosion-control BMPs.
3.1.4 How will implementation and enforcement of the TMDL be achieved?
Along with the allocation of loads, and the reductions in discharges they imply,
TMDLs must specify policies to achieve those allocations.
69 How are allocations to be
monitored? What enforcement tools can be brought to bear to ensure compliance? Is
private or public funding available for the technological and management changes
implied by the allocations? The more specific and helpful a TMDL is in response to these
questions, the more likely are its load reductions to be translated from aspirations into
reality.
The Columbia Slough TMDL is noteworthy in that it provides particularly
detailed descriptions of implementation activities. Implementation takes a variety of
forms, including monitoring, revisions to NPDES permits, public capital projects, and the
use of BMPs. Monitoring requirements include an ongoing study of airport-related BOD,
a survey of area septic systems to identify sources of bacteria, and monitoring of toxic
runoff associated with environmental cleanup sites. Revision of the airport’s NPDES
permit is identified as a way to promote more effective treatment of de-icing runoff.
 70
Public capital projects that will lead to reductions include the construction of sanitary
sewers, removal of cesspools, construction of treatment facilities for CSOs, and
separation of sewers from stormwater systems.
71 Both private landowners and local
government entities are required to use a variety of BMPs, including redesign of roof
drains to avoid bacteria discharges from septic systems, techniques to control erosion and
the transport of contaminated sediment, and changes in flow management by the area
drainage district.
 72 Renewal of stormwater permits will also be made conditional on
evidence of BMP compliance.
73
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The plans also must be explicit in their assignment of responsibility for
monitoring activities and BMP implementation among government entities. Memoranda
of agreement between designated management agencies form the basis for this division of
authority.
74 Responsibility is divided between the DEQ, a collection of municipal
governments, county government, and the state departments of agriculture and
transportation.
75 In addition, DEQ lists a set of possible funding sources for TMDL-
related attainment projects, available to both private and public entities.
76
On paper, the Columbia Slough TMDL illustrates the promise of a water-quality-
driven regulatory approach. The TMDL identifies impairments and their sources,
allocates responsibility for source reductions and management improvements, and offers
a detailed plan for monitoring and implementing improvements. Thus, it marks an
ambitious expansion of efforts relative to those associated with conventional water
quality regulation. The TMDL expands waterbody and source monitoring and the
techniques used to analyze pollutant transport and deposition. The plan also imposes
regulatory requirements on previously unregulated sources and mandates changes in land
and water management practices throughout the drainage area. Finally, the TMDL
notifies the source of those problems and identifies the private and public parties
responsible for improvements.
3.2 Other Examples
One of the distinguishing features of Columbia Slough is that agricultural
nonpoint sources are not a significant source of impairment. As noted earlier, agricultural
nonpoint sources will be featured in many TMDLs, because of the prevalence of
excessive nutrient loadings in many of the nation’s waterways. A brief description of
nutrient TMDLs is therefore instructive. Like the Columbia Slough analyses, TMDLs for
nutrients involve modeling exercises to determine source contributions from agriculture,
urban nonpoint sources, and point sources  all of which can contribute to nitrogen and
phosphorus loads.
North Carolina’s plan for nitrogen reduction in the Neuse River basin is
illustrative.
77 The TMDL estimates the relative contributions of point and nonpoint
sources and calls for 30% reductions in nitrogen loads from both point and nonpoint
sources. For agricultural nonpoint sources, the TMDL proposes to achieve reductions via
farmer participation in local planning exercises or compliance with BMPs (specifically,
installation of forested riparian areas or vegetative filter strips). Other initiatives included
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in the TMDL are a requirement that those applying fertilizer to areas of more than 50
acres receive training in nutrient management.
A characteristic of several nutrient TMDLs is that reductions are sought from both
point sources and from nonpoint sources. Maryland requires NPDES permitting changes
for sewage treatment in the Port Tobacco watershed.
78 California calls for revision of
NPDES permits to meet nutrient reductions in San Diego Creek and Newport Bay.
79
Delaware’s Nanticoke River TMDL requires nutrient removal at three wastewater
treatment plants.
80 And Delaware’s Indian River TMDL calls for the total elimination of
point source discharges.
81 Interestingly, several TMDLs are also counting on reductions
in atmospheric deposition from more stringent Clean Air Act controls on emissions of
nitrogen oxides to meet nitrogen load reduction goals.
82
In all of these cases, however, the net is also cast toward unregulated sources,
including agricultural nonpoint sources. All of the aforementioned TMDLs set nonpoint
allocations. The San Diego Creek TMDL proposes to extend discharge requirements to
small, unregulated nurseries. It also requires the development of nutrient management
plans for all agricultural operations not regulated by waste discharge requirements. The
Maryland Port Tobacco TMDL’s nonpoint allocation assumes no additional requirements
beyond existing BMP practices. It does suggest that existing state programs will support
the implementation of future nonpoint source controls, however. To achieve their
nonpoint allocations, Delaware’s Nanticoke River and Indian River TMDLs require plans
to institute agricultural BMPs. . And as noted above, North Carolina’s Neuse River
TMDL explicitly requires expansion in the use of agricultural BMPs.
The problems associated with translating nonpoint allocations into concrete
improvements are explored below.
83 TMDLs completed to date, however, do indicate that
a set of previously unregulated, unmanaged sources is gaining, at the very least,
heightened regulatory scrutiny.
4.  LONG-RUN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM
Having described the scope and promise of the new TMDL rules, we turn now to
issues raised by the long-run implementation of the program. The federal government and
states have broad, if somewhat untested, legal authority to expand controls to previously
unregulated sources. Their respective authorities are described below, as are the policy
tools available to promote source reductions and beneficial land and water management
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practices. The set of scientific, legal, and practical challenges that states will face as they
seek approval for and implementation of their TMDL programs is also explored.
4.1 Federal Authority and Nonpoint Sources
The Clean Water Act prohibits discharge of a pollutant without a permit.
84 This
broad prohibition is subject to a very important limitation, however. It applies in a legal
sense only to discharges from point sources.
85 One way to expand federal legal authority
is the semantic strategy of simply relabeling nonpoint sources as point sources.
86 As
described earlier, the EPA is currently proposing an expansion of the definition of point
sources to large-scale feeding operations and certain aquacultural and silvicultural
practices.
87 Even smaller agricultural operations may be reclassified as sources subject to
NPDES permitting, or threatened with such reclassification as an incentive to improve
management practices.
88 But despite efforts to expand the universe of sources subject to
the CWA’s permitting, there remains a large universe of sources that resist simple
reclassification.
As a result, the CWA’s powerful permit-driven mode of regulation is not
applicable to the primary cause of current water degradation. Some federal leverage
exists, but it is more indirect than that provided for the CWA’s point source provisions.
For example, section 319 of the act addresses waters impaired by nonpoint sources. The
section requires states to submit reports of such impairment, identify broad categories of
sources, and identify BMPs and other measures to control “to the maximum extent
practicable” pollution from those sources.
89 States are left with the discretion to
determine whether control efforts are to be regulatory or nonregulatory, compelled or
voluntary. Nowhere in the section is an explicit enforcement authority granted the federal
government. In principle the federal government could withhold a state’s NPDES
permitting authority if the state fails to follow through on section 319’s requirements.
90
But this extreme measure is not a substitute for a more explicit, practical federal ability to
compel nonpoint reductions.
91
More subtle forms of federal influence are available. Appropriations are available
to states under section 319 and section 208. The threat of funding withdrawals, while a
relatively weak incentive given the limited nature of funds at stake, is available to EPA.
92
Section 208 instructs states, among other things, to develop a process to identify
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agriculture- and forestry- related nonpoint sources. These sources include return flows
from irrigated agriculture, runoff from manure disposal areas and land used for livestock
and crop production. The section sets forth procedures and methods (including land use
requirements) to control such sources to the extent feasible
 93 and provides revocable
funding for the process.
94 EPA efforts to motivate state nonpoint initiatives is illustrated
by an EPA memo to regional administrators, calling on them to “focus substantial grant
dollars … toward those states that are providing reasonable assurances that nonpoint
source load allocations established in TMDLs will in fact be achieved.”
95 The memo also
suggests that the administrators may “deny or revoke a state's enhanced benefits status
under the new section 319 nonpoint source guidance.” These types of funding incentives
indicate the EPA’s concern with state nonpoint program development. They also signal
the lack of more substantive authority on the part of EPA to motivate that development.
Federal authority over the management of federal lands can be used to promote
nonpoint source improvements. The Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
can use their authority to ensure adequate water monitoring and the implementation of
BMPs for grazing, logging, and road construction activities. In fact, both agencies have
mandates to manage public lands for multiple uses, including recreation, fish and
wildlife, and watershed uses.
96 Also, section 401 of the CWA empowers the states to
review facilities or activities that require a federal permit. Thus, states can compel federal
agencies to manage lands in a manner compatible with waterquality standards.
97
Finally, the Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve and Wetland
Reserve Programs in principle could be harnessed to promote BMPs on agricultural land.
Access to agricultural price support and land retirement programs could be made
conditional on the adoption of pesticide and fertilizer reductions, though this is not
current practice.
98
Regarding the TMDL program itself, it is clear that primary authority for policies
to implement TMDLs resides with the states. States have primary responsibility for
developing their own lists of impaired waters and they are granted wide latitude to
determine their own priorities and implementation plans.
99 Recent litigation and the
EPA’s own posture suggest that there must and will be a strong federal oversight of these
state programs, however.
100 The proposed rules outline the agency’s vision of its own
authority. According to the rules, “EPA has strong and diverse authorities to implement
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controls over nonpoint sources in the event that EPA were to disapprove a TMDL
submitted by a State and to develop a TMDL for the impaired water.”
101 This assertion
sounds somewhat defensive and should since, as previously argued, federal authority
to compel nonpoint controls is limited. However, the rule identifies section 504 as one
particular source of federal authority. Under 504, the administrator can compel action
when there is an “imminent or substantial endangerment to health or welfare of persons.”
As an example of such an endangerment, the rule suggests a community’s inability to
market contaminated shellfish.
But in general the federal TMDL program is not self-implementing. As the
proposed rule acknowledges, load allocations for nonpoint sources are not directly
enforceable under the CWA. “With respect to nonpoint sources,” the rule reads, “the load
allocations in a TMDL are only ‘enforceable’ to the extend they are made so by State
laws and regulations.”
102 Despite the federal government’s clear role in prompting and
overseeing state action under section 303, it is state law that ultimately will determine the
effectiveness of the TMDL programs in their long-term implementation.
4.2 State Authority and Nonpoint Sources
The litmus test of the TMDL program’s success will be its ability to promote
more effective nonpoint controls at the state level.
103 Nonpoint sources will increasingly
occupy the attention of states as they identify impairments and sources and develop plans
for water quality improvement. But as argued above, nonpoint sources historically have
not been the prime target of regulation. Moreover, there is likely to be political pressure
at the state level to avoid an expansion of controls to this category of sources. State
initiatives to date have relied heavily on voluntary, unenforceable measures, particularly
with regard to agricultural runoff.
104 Taken together, these factors raise concerns about
the states’ willingness to meaningfully compel reductions in nonpoint loads. The EPA’s
proposed TMDL rules anticipate this concern by requiring “reasonable assurance” of
implementation. These reasonable assurances require states to specify implementation
policies, the timing of controls or incentives, analysis of the likely effectiveness of
policies, and funding sources.
105
For point sources, consistency with NPDES permits is considered a valid
“assurance” of implementation. For nonpoint sources, the most direct assurance of
implementation is the availability of state laws to compel nonpoint controls, and the
willingness to enforce those laws. There are in fact a large number of state statutory
provisions that could be called into service. These laws include general prohibitions
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against pollution discharges, enforcement actions triggered by fish kills or threats to
public health, sedimentation and erosion laws, and laws designed to protect specific areas
for conservation.
106 Most states have access to such statutory levers, which can be
directly cited as a form of reasonable assurance. In addition, regulations governing
stormwater runoff and zoning and other land use ordinances would likely qualify.
Assurance could also be demonstrated by management contracts between government
agencies and land users, memoranda of understanding between government entities, and
bonding requirements to ensure appropriate land management practices. A variety of
approaches will arise as state regulators seek innovative ways to motivate quality
improvements. For example, there are proposals in Washington State to limit irrigation
water allocations to farmers who fail to take precautions against sediment runoff.
107 In
Iowa, a pilot insurance plan reduces the risk to farmers of under-performing crop yields
when they scale back on fertilizer applications.
108 These examples are indicative of the
policy innovation that is already occurring, and that can be harnessed by states to compel
or otherwise promote nonpoint load reductions.
On one hand, the long list of existing state enforcement tools is reassuring. On the
other hand, that long list has to date failed to yield adequate water quality in many of the
nation’s streams, lakes, and estuaries. In some cases the failure is due to explicit
exemptions for certain nonpoint sources. In other cases the law may simply be
unenforced. Many of the states with general discharge provisions explicitly exempt
agriculture.
109 Massachusetts prohibits the discharge of any pollutant without a permit,
but agricultural nonpoint discharges are exempted.
110 Exemptions are also found in more
targeted regulations. In Ohio land development that disturbs the soil cannot occur without
the approval of the state.
111 But this requirement does not extend to agricultural
operations. The TMDL-driven need for load reductions may erode some of these
statutory exemptions as point sources exert political pressure of their own to avoid
further, costly point source reductions and environmental interests focus greater attention
on impairments.
112 Dormant provisions may also be called into more active service by
state program administrators, who must ultimately demonstrate real pollutant reductions
under section 303.
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4.3 Best Management Practices as Enforceable Standards
Best Management Practices are a central feature of most nonpoint source control
programs. BMPs are management standards that guide forest, agriculture, construction,
and other activities in order to reduce nonpoint runoff. BMPs are based on the practical
experience of land managers and improvements in the scientific and technical
understanding of the relationship between land management practices and environmental
impacts. In agriculture, examples include the installation of buffer strips along stream
beds, adequate fencing to keep livestock from directly soiling surface water, the
placement of sheds over manure piles to minimize runoff, and the use of pest control
techniques that are low in chemical intensity. Forestry BMPs include harvest and road
construction planning to avoid soil erosion from trails, roads, and stream crossings.
Construction BMPs have a similar focus on techniques to minimize sedimentation due to
erosion caused by soil disturbance. BMPs for municipalities include procedures to
minimize the impact of road salting on urban runoff.
Depending on their application, BMPs can represent informal rules of thumb or
be subject to approval by a government entity, such as a conservation district, state, or the
U.S. Forest Service. As an illustration, Florida employs BMPs approved by a variety of
organizations, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture Natural Resources
Conservation Service and the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
(FDAC). FDAC has issued specific conservation practices for the purpose of protecting
Florida's water resources (including streams, lakes, and wetlands) from pollution
associated with forestry operations.
113 These BMPs were originally designed in the mid-
1970s in response to the CWA, but were revised in 1993 with the assistance of
representatives from state and federal government, universities, the forest industry, and
environmental groups. The recommended practices are detailed and depend on the size
and type of waterbody involved, the local soil type, and the general potential of the site
for erosion and sedimentation. A BMP Technical Advisory Committee meets biennially
to evaluate the status and progress of BMP implementation and effectiveness.
114
Section 208 of the CWA, which mandates state water quality plans,
115 calls on
states to describe in its plans the BMPS “which the [state] agency has selected as the
means to control nonpoint source pollution where necessary to protect or achieve
approved water uses.” The section outlines the desired characteristics of BMPs for a
variety of nonpoint source categories.
116
BMPs represent the nonpoint analog to end-of-pipe controls on point sources.
They identify the technologies and techniques that lead to pollutant reductions. In some
cases, states use BMPs as an aspirational goal or background threat, rather than as
enforceable standards. Colorado law calls for the development and approval of BMPs by
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the state department of agriculture, but defines BMPs as “any voluntary activity,
procedure, or practice.”
117 Thus, BMPs are not directly enforceable. Colorado does
encourage their use to avoid the possibility of future regulation if “continued monitoring
reveals that rules and regulations … are not preventing or mitigating the presence of the
subject agricultural chemical to the extent necessary.”
118 But reliance on voluntary efforts
should be viewed with skepticism, since such techniques are costly to employ.
119
In other cases, BMPs are directly enforceable. Oregon law calls on the State
Forestry Board to develop and require the use of BMPs “as necessary to insure that to the
maximum extent practicable nonpoint source discharges of pollutants resulting from
forest operations on forestlands do not impair the achievement and maintenance of water
quality standards … for the waters of the state.” Criminal and civil penalties can be levied
for failure to use these BMPs.
120 This regulatory “stick” is complemented by a significant
“carrot,” however. Forest operations conducted in accordance with BMPs can be a
defense against claims of violating water quality standards.
121 In Maryland, agricultural
operations must employ BMPs under soil conservation district plans to protect nontidal
wetlands.
122 Similar requirements are imposed on agriculture in proximity to waters
flowing into the Chesapeake Bay.
123 Federal law can compel the implementation of
BMPs, particularly on federal lands.
124 And states can independently force the federal
government to make its financial assistance programs, permits, licenses, and development
projects conform with state nonpoint control programs, which may feature BMPs.
125
Recent cases illustrate a growing judicial awareness of the importance of BMPs.
In Sierra Club v. Martin
126 the U.S. Forest Service’s adherence to BMPs was at issue. In
Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood
127 BMPs associated with a site
assessment were found to be inadequate, given the characteristics of the site. Idaho
Sporting Congress v. Jemmet,
128 tested the compliance of a National Forest timber sale
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contract with applicable BMPs. These cases suggest that increasingly BMPS can and will
be examined to determine compliance with statutory land management requirements.
4.4 The Technical Basis for Listing Criteria and Load Modeling
The TMDL program requires states to develop scientifically and legally
defensible data collection procedures, listing criteria, and watershed modeling tools.
129
TMDLs may be challenged if the implementing state agency fails to adequately define
and employ these technical duties. In terms of listing waters as impaired, the EPA’s
proposed rules require states to include with their 303(d) lists a description of the
methodology and factors used to prioritize and list waters as impaired.
130 As an example,
the description of methodology can include an explanation of how the number and
severity of “exceedances” of a numeric chemical criterion translate into an impairment.
Similar requirements are applied to TMDL loadreduction plans. Implementation plans are
required to contain monitoring and modeling procedures that will be used gauge the
effectiveness of load reduction actions. States are also required to explain their approach
to “assessing the effectiveness of best management practices and control actions for
nonpoint sources.”
131 These requirements may slow the process of TMDL
implementation, since they require the adoption of what may for some states be new
techniques. Pollutant sources, unhappy with their designation, may also seek relief from
TMDL load reductions by challenging a state’s modeling tools, water quality criteria, and
data collection procedures.
132
Recent litigation has focused on one state agency’s inability to promulgate lawful
303(d) listing criteria and TMDLs associated with nutrient water quality standards.
133 In
the case, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control’s (DHEC)
listing standards, and TMDLs based on them, were voided by an administrative law
judge. The agency was found to have violated proper public notice and other procedural
safeguards designed to subject its standards and models to technical and legal scrutiny.
According to the court, “DHEC has pursued is mission with unpromulgated regulations
that should have been, but were not, subject to the scrutiny of DHEC’s Board, the South
Carolina General Assembly, and the public.”
While federal water quality standards are available, they are published by EPA
only as nonregulatory guidance.
134 The promulgation of water quality standards lies
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squarely within the jurisdiction of state law. Moreover, the CWA requires that criteria
adopted by states must be consistent with their own laws governing how regulations
become law.
135 DHEC’s failure was to inadequately translate “narrative” state water
quality criteria into “numeric” standards for phosphorus, inorganic nitrogen, and
chlorophyll a. Narrative standards are common in state statutes and, as the term suggests,
are general, verbal descriptions of required water quality. In South Carolina, one such
narrative standard reads that waters  shall be free from “waste in concentrations or
combinations which interfere with classified water uses…, existing water uses, or which
are harmful to human, animal, plant, or aquatic life.
136 The court explained that the state
must “for both practical and regulatory reasons, ‘translate’ its narrative water quality
criteria into numerical values when making Section 303(d0 listing determinations.” The
court found that the state failed to make this translation in a way that satisfied procedural
requirements. The standards being used by DHEC failed to have “clear bounds and a
rational basis for their implementation.” The agency cannot relist the waters under 303(d)
until the EPA approves the “translation procedure” for converting South Carolina’s
narrative criteria into numeric criteria.
Perhaps more significantly, the judge’s ruling also requires the agency to conduct
a case-specific assessment of the waterbodies and sources in question. Assessment of the
waterbodies is essentially a data collection and evaluation exercise. The analysis of
sources is typically more complicated. Specifically, the agency must conduct an
evaluation “of the point and nonpoint source nutrient loadings, of other possible causes or
contributors to water quality impairment, and of whether Section 303(d) listing can be
avoided by DHEC’s full implementation of existing point and nonpoint source controls,
including full implementation of BMPs at nonpoint sources.” This kind of exercise is
fraught with technical difficulties. Analysis of loadings and the effect of load reductions
requires some form of watershed-wide modeling that captures transport process (such as
infiltration and runoff), groundwater and surface water interactions, pollutant
accumulation and decay, and instream mixing. In the case of nonpoint source loads, the
science is relatively undeveloped due to the complexity of interacting systems
involved.
137 Knowledge of the relationship between control practices and loadings is
particularly poor. According to an EPA supporting document for TMDL development, a
key challenge facing agencies is “the lack of highly developed, scientifically sound
approaches to identify problems in watersheds and to predict the results of potential
control actions on water quality. While a wide variety of models is available, each comes
with limitations on its use, applicability, and predictive capabilities.”
138
Consider one particular, and relatively narrow, technical issue: the interaction
between groundwater and surface water quality. The “flows” of groundwater into surface
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water (or vice versa) are themselves highly uncertain and may occur over a period of
decades. Such uncertainty and attenuation make determinations of cause and effect nearly
impossible. The long time lag also limits the ability of researchers to measure the effect
of control actions on the quality of receiving water. Moreover, the conditions under
which surface and groundwater interact have a crucial effect on water chemistry (acidity,
oxygen content, temperature) and biological conditions that ultimately affect water
quality.
139 Unfortunately, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, “research on the
interface between ground water and surface water has increased in recent years but only a
few stream environments have been studied, and the transfer value of the research results
is limited and uncertain.”
140
A lack of scientific certainty will in and of itself not legally hobble TMDL plans,
since certainty is not a prerequisite for program implementation.
141 Uncertainty does
place a premium, however, on administrative procedures that provide the greatest
possible level of scientific credibility to standards, models, and data collection.
Accordingly, the technical details of state TMDL programs will need to engage in
ongoing notice and comment procedures and evaluation by expert panels. This is likely to
be a source of both significant upfront and long-run program costs.
4.5 Jurisdictional Conflicts
Section 303 provides a great deal of state latitude to determine standards and
implementation strategies. This latitude, together with the lack of correspondence
between state boundaries and watershed boundaries, raises the possibility of jurisdictional
conflict over TMDLs. Most obviously, downstream water segments may inherit water
quality problems from upstream sources in other states. Standards differ across states,
sometimes to a significant degree.
142 Less stringent water quality standards and less
effective implementation upstream can alone create impairments in a downstream state
with stricter quality standards. For this reason, the proposed rules require states to
identify a process for resolving disagreements with other jurisdictions.
143 The rules also
state that the EPA may establish TMDLs “when interstate or international issues and
coordination needs require EPA to assume a leadership role.” This will be particularly
true in the case of large rivers or boundary waters. The agency also sees a role for itself in
determining “equitable upstream / downstream allocations … that account for loadings to
downstream waterbodies like the Chesapeake Bay from far away upstream sources.”
144
The need for a federal coordinating presence is likely to be particularly acute
when conflicts arise as the result of atmospheric deposition. Atmospheric deposition
occurs when airborne pollution is deposited directly to the surface of the waterbody, or
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indirectly onto land and waters within the watershed that feeds the waterbody. Because
atmospheric deposition is a major source of water impairment, section 303(d)
inextricably links state compliance with controls mandated by the Clean Air Act.
According to the EPA, 80% of the Delaware Bay’s mercury load, 46% of Tampa Bay’s
cadmium load, and 27% of the Chesapeake Bay’s nitrogen load have airborne sources.
145
The significance of these atmospheric loadings is that they implicate sources over a huge
geographic area. Deposition in the Chesapeake Bay is a particularly pertinent example.
Studies based on data from the National Acid Deposition Assessment Program suggest
that only 25% of air deposition in the Chesapeake watershed originates from sources
within the watershed (which contains areas in six states).
146 The Chesapeake NOx
“airshed,” which defines the geographic range of airborne nitrogen sources to the bay,
covers areas in 13 states plus the District of Columbia. Given the significance of air
deposition in that watershed, and the broad geographic range of sources, there is the
distinct possibility of jurisdictional conflict that necessitates federal intervention.
4.6 TMDLs and Water Quantity Law
As they move toward implementation, TMDL rules will increasingly highlight the
artificial distinction between water quality and quantity issues, particularly in the West.
Water quantity decisions, which are controlled primarily by state law, often have a direct
impact on water quality. For instance, changes in stream flow affect the transport of
pollutants through a waterbody. Also, the amount of water taken or returned to a
waterbody may significantly affect the dilution of pollutants in that system. Finally, water
supply often determines the suitability of a waterbody as habitat for fish or other species.
In fact, reduced stream flows can constitute “water pollution” under the CWA.
147 At a
practical level, TMDLs will often have to account for seasonal changes in flow in order
to set appropriate loadings consistent with state water quality standards.
148 Because of
these interactions, water quantity decisions relating to irrigation, damming, reservoir
management, basin-to-basin trades, and the like. may result in changes in the waters’
303(d) status. Correspondingly, TMDLs will in some cases constrain water transfers
involving impaired waterbodies.
As argued above, a wide variety of unresolved legal issues attend the
implementation of the TMDL program. The interrelationship between water quantity
decisions and water quality conditions will present particularly challenging issues. Water
quantity law has a well-deserved reputation for complexity. Water rights have both public
and private characteristics, water law is largely state-determined, different laws govern
groundwater and surface water (even though they are physically interdependent), and
entirely different systems for establishing rights are used in different regions of the
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country.
149 In terms of interjurisdictional conflict, states have a long history of conflict
over water quantity apportionment.
150 This type of conflict will likely increase under the
TMDL program as water quality impairments become binding enforcement problems.
One consequence of quality concerns may be an increasing reliance on water
quantity acquisitions to preserve stream flows, an approach endorsed by the TMDL
Federal Advisory Committee.
151 Federal acquisitions have already occurred as a result of
concerns over species habitat.
152 Many states already have in place the legal foundations
necessary to allow purchase and trade of water rights to preserve instream flow.
153
4.7 Offsets and the Location of Sources
TMDLs will raise the costs of, or create a prohibition against, source development
in watersheds suffering from impairment. The most immediate impact will be seen under
the proposed NPDES rule changes that require offsets to new point source discharges.
154
This kind of restriction, or any other policy that creates barriers to new sources, is a
necessary element of any policy geared toward water quality improvements. An
unintended consequence of TMDLs, however, is that they may encourage the migration
of point and nonpoint sources to areas that are currently not associated with water
impairment. In other words, TMDLs may lead to a kind of “greenfields” (“blue waters?”)
problem.
155 The more successful that policies are in limiting loadings in impaired areas,
the greater will be the incentive of dischargers to relocate to areas where TMDL-driven
restrictions are not as binding, or control costs are not as high.
5.  ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND POLLUTANT TRADING
A distinctive feature of the EPA’s approach to TMDL rules, and its watershed
policy more generally, is an emphasis on trading to achieve “common-sense, cost-
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effective solutions for water quality problems.”
156 In principle, trading is highly desirable.
Trading allows sources with responsibility for discharge reductions the flexibility to
determine where those reductions will occur. The financial incentives built into a trading
scheme lead naturally to a situation in which the costs of pollution control are
minimized.
157 Pollution permit markets, in a decentralized manner, assign control
activities to the parties whose control costs are least. Such assignment is economically
efficient. It is also politically attractive, since it minimizes compliance costs for a given
pollutant reduction goal. In terms of water quality regulation, the desirability of trading
arises out of a vast disparity in pollutant control costs across sources. The appeal is
especially strong when nonpoint sources are considered.
158 Nonpoint source BMPs are
thought to be a particularly cost-effective means to achieve water quality
improvements.
159 For example, if point sources with high control costs can purchase
cheaper controls from nonpoint sources, the control cost savings may be significant.
A wide variety of trading possibilities is contemplated by EPA. A justification for
the new source offset rule is that “EPA believes this proposed requirement will serve as a
catalyst for the establishment of a trading market between large new dischargers and
existing dischargers undergoing a significant expansion, and existing point source
dischargers or nonpoint sources.”
160 Point-point, point-nonpoint, and nonpoint-nonpoint
trades are all envisioned.
161 The cost savings and flexibility provided by trading are the
principal motivations.
162 Potential savings from point-point trading alone are estimated to
be as high as $1.9 billion per year.
163
The theoretical desirability of pollution trading is accompanied by a host of
sobering practical challenges, however.
164 And the history of actual point-point trading to
date under the CWA is very limited. More limited still is persuasive evidence that trading
actually will result in significant cost savings.
5.1 Trading under the Clean Water Act
The history of water quality trading can be summarized relatively briefly. There
are approximately 15 trading programs in the United States, though not all have actually
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resulted in trades.
165 Notable trading experiments include the now-defunct Fox River
BOD trading program in Wisconsin. Preliminary estimates of the savings from this point-
point trading program were $7 million a year for the participating firms.
166 Unfortunately,
and in stark contrast to the prediction of cost savings, the program only produced a single
trade. In Colorado, the Dillon Reservoir trading system allows trade between point
sources and nonpoint sources to reduce phosphorus loadings in the reservoir. Point-
nonpoint trading activity has not actually materialized. However, two trades between
nonpoint sources have occurred as nonpoint sources have become the primary remaining
source of discharges.
167 The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency has approved a single
trade, which substitutes nonpoint phosphorus source reductions for a point source
reduction on the Minnesota River.
168 In North Carolina, the Tar-Pamlico plan calls for
point source nutrient reductions. Point sources must meet a cap on discharges or make a
mandatory financial contribution to a nonpoint source reduction fund used to implement
agricultural BMPs. To date, the point sources have met the annually decreasing cap,
primarily via improvements to treatment facilities.
169 These and other trading programs
indicate state and EPA willingness to experiment with the trading approach. They are not
particularly inspiring examples, however, of trading’s ability either to achieve significant
cost reductions, or to spark enthusiasm from the regulated community. What is
remarkable is how actual little trading has arisen from these programs.
5.2 The Barriers to Water Quality Trading
An effective trading system requires several fundamental ingredients. Among
them are, first, a sound means of enforcement to ensure that commitments (load
reductions) are adhered to; second, a legal foundation that allows control flexibility
sufficient to generate financial gains to participation; and third, an administratively
straightforward process for participating in the market.
170 In the case of water quality
trading, many of these ingredients currently are missing.
Perhaps the greatest barrier to water quality trading is the sheer complexity of
factors that determine watershed loadings. Even if a source’s releases are perfectly
known a tall order in itself, particularly for nonpoint sources the transport and
deposition of releases are subject to numerous uncertainties relating to geography,
hydrography, and weather conditions.
171 Once present in a waterbody, a pollutant’s
contribution to impairment is often a function of the waterbody’s assimilative capacity
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(which is itself a function of rainfall), temperature, salinity, acidity, and other localized
chemical characteristics. This variability causes several problems for a trading program
because it makes it difficult to draw causal relationships between specific sources and
water quality problems. This causation problem creates an obvious monitoring problem,
unless releases can be monitored at each potential source. Second, it makes it nearly
impossible to quantitatively relate control practices (e.g., a reduction in fertilizer
application) to loadings.
172 Establishing those relationships is necessary to establish
appropriate trading ratios. Trading ratios account for differences in the way control
practices affect loadings. For instance, a pound of phosphorus applied to land far from a
waterbody will tend to contribute less to loadings than one applied close to the
waterbody. If trading is allowed to occur between owners of two different pieces of land
that are respectively located far and near a waterbody, then an appropriate trading ratio
must be established to ensure that the loading goal is met. Specifically, if landowners
near waterbodies are to increase phosphorus applications, they must purchase reductions
from their trading partners at a greater than 1-to-1 rate. The complexity of watershed
interactions does not permit the implementation of such trading ratios.
The complexity of watershed systems also contributes to the overall monitoring
problem. End-of–pipe monitoring allows for relatively precise monitoring of point source
discharges. In general, this kind of precision is not available for nonpoint source loads.
The EPA’s proposed rules include “margins of safety” and greater than 1-to-1 offsets to
account for the monitoring and causal uncertainties associated with nonpoint sources.
 173
For instance, under the new-source offset provisions, point sources may be required to
achieve offsets of up to 200%.
One counter-example is a nonpoint program for phosphorus releases into Lake
Okeechobee that relies on nonpoint source monitoring. It is the exception that proves the
rule, however. The monitoring takes advantage of the lake system’s artificially
constructed hydrography, including canals and pumping facilities. Elsewhere, monitoring
strategies include proposals for remote-sensing via satellite to determine compliance with
land management and construction requirements, such as buffers, cover crops, and
irrigation systems.
174 Finally, in some cases, quantitative modeling may be used to
indirectly estimate loadings. Results from studies in one area can be used to generalize
the relationships between observable practices and typical effects in another. While
clearly imperfect, such tools may be the most pragmatic means of injecting some
knowledge of control-loading relationships into a trading framework.
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While the problems associated with nonpoint monitoring and trading are
significant, it is perhaps even more significant that water quality trading has to date failed
to provide significant benefits even among point sources. The reasons for this failure are
largely legal. Technology-based requirements (and their associated effluent standards) are
non-negotiable under the CWA.
175 All point source dischargers must install appropriate
treatment to achieve these required discharge levels. It is explicit EPA policy that trading
participants can in no way be absolved of this baseline technical requirement.
176 While
this position may be understandable from an enforcement standpoint, it significantly
limits the flexibility over control options. And limited flexibility means limited gains
from trading.
Flexibility is limited in a number of other ways.
177 For instance, point source
effluent standards are industry-specific. Since effluent standards are non-negotiable under
the CWA, presumably no trading can occur across firms in different industries. The
practical effect of this lack of flexibility is that a firm seeking a trade may find no other
eligible firms even to approach.
178 In financial parlance, the situation is equivalent to a
lack of liquidity and undermines the ability of the trading market to discover and take
advantage of cost savings. Another lack of flexibility arises from prohibitions on trading
across pollutants. For instance, under the new-source offset proposal, the EPA makes
clear that the offset must be for the same pollutant.
179
The informational, scientific, and legal barriers to water quality trading are
significant. State experimentation with nonpoint programs and the development of
analytical techniques to relate control practices and loadings can be expected. But the
history of water quality trading to date invokes pessimism regarding the benefits likely to
be secured by sophisticated new trading schemes involving point and nonpoint sources.
These schemes are largely untried and administratively complex.
180 The search for cost-
effective approaches to water quality improvement should not be allowed to hinge on
trading alone. Instead, a variety of more direct forms of regulation, such as mandatory,
enforceable BMPs, should also, and perhaps first, be applied to nonpoint sources.
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5.3 Allocations, Baselines, and Liability
One of the most important policy choices in a trading system is the determination
of who is initially responsible for pollutant reductions. Consider two different trading
schemes. In the first, point sources are responsible for pollutant reductions but can
purchase reductions from each other or from nonpoint sources. In the second, both point
sources and nonpoint sources are responsible for reductions, but can trade among
themselves to achieve those reductions in the most cost-effective manner. The federal
TMDL program leaves the choice of trading program entirely up to the states. If states are
to introduce trading, this type of choice will have to be made. At a basic level, this choice
is one over the distribution of the costs of discharge reductions. Both systems allow
trading, so theoretically both will result in the same least-cost pattern of reductions after
trading has occurred. They differ, however, in their allocation of liability for reductions.
In the former case, liability lies with point sources. This means that point sources must
bear the costs of reducing their own releases or else pay nonpoint sources to reduce
theirs. In the latter case, liability is shared. Since nonpoint sources are themselves subject
to controls, they must bear the costs of achieving reductions, or purchase them elsewhere.
In addition to determining the initial liability allocation, any trading system must
also clearly define baseline (before-the-fact) discharges. This baseline is necessary if
trading-driven discharge reductions are to be verified by regulators. The artificial
inflation of baselines is a problem that any trading system must address. Polluters selling
credits have an incentive to inflate baseline discharges since inflation increases the
amount of discharge reductions they can claim to provide. In the case of point sources,
NPDES permits provide a verifiable inventory of baseline releases. Moreover, the point
source permitting process counteracts any incentive to overstate releases. Under point
source permitting, larger releases tend to imply more stringent, costly control
technologies. The nonpoint source situation is quite different. Having not been subject to
permit requirements, nonpoint sources lack an independently verifiable, and incentive-
compatible baseline. Thus, a problematic tendency of such sources will be to initially
overestimate releases in an attempt to generate larger reduction credits. One way to
minimize this kind of problem is to allocate responsibility for reductions to nonpoint
sources at the outset. With nonpoint discharge standards, nonpoint sources have a
countervailing incentive to underclaim contributions to loadings. Of course the larger
implication is the need for independent verification of releases.
The enforcement of a trading system is also directly related to the allocation of
liability. For instance, consider the proposed rules’ new-source offset requirements. This
allocation of liability is akin to the first one considered above. Point sources are liable for
off-setting reductions. These reductions can be purchased from nonpoint sources,
however. In the event of noncompliance by a nonpoint source, it is the point source that is
subject to enforcement action, not the nonpoint source.
181 This formulation is the case
under the EPA watershed trading framework as well.
182 Consider comments on EPA’s
trading framework from one point source, concerned that “the lack of defined legislation
and regulatory controls of nonpoint sources may result in the point source partner of a
point source/nonpoint source effluent trading agreement being held solely liable for
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violations of a water quality standard, even though the source of the violation may be the
nonpoint source.”
183 However, any point-nonpoint trade presumably involves a
contractual agreement between the sources that is independently enforceable under
contract law. While agency enforcement action would be directed at the point source, the
point source could exercise its contractual remedy in order to secure the nonpoint
source’s compliance with contract terms. Nevertheless, point source liability for nonpoint
source noncompliance increases the transaction costs associated with trading. This cost
increase creates yet another argument for direct enforcement of nonpoint controls by
states.
6. CONCLUSION
The Total Maximum Daily Load program will significantly alter the politics,
economics, and implementation of water quality regulation. Improved monitoring of
ambient water quality conditions and the accessible public documentation of impairments
will focus government and public attention on water conditions that continue to be
problematic, even after 25 years of CWA regulation. While industrial point sources will
no doubt continue to be vivid symbols of the nation’s water pollution problems, this
image is increasingly inappropriate. Nonpoint agricultural, commercial, and urban
sources, while harder to caricature, are the rightful focus of dissatisfaction. The most
powerful aspect of EPA’s proposed TMDL rules is that they are motivated by, and
address, water quality issues created by nonpoint sources. The holistic, watershed-level
analysis required by the TMDL process will inevitably identify a larger sphere of often
unregulated discharge sources. For these reasons alone, the TMDL program is likely to
promote significant, desirable changes in the targets and implementation of water quality
regulation. This article has provided specific examples of TMDLs and the way in which
they are improving the public’s knowledge of impairments, motivating new analytic
techniques for the identification of sources, and promoting experimentation with new
water quality policies. This movement toward a water-quality-driven approach marks a
welcome, mature phase of water quality regulation.
The changes to be initiated by the new TMDL rules present a host of challenges.
These challenges call for tempered optimism and a willingness to confront the significant
implementation issues that will arise from a TMDL-based regulatory system. First, there
are numerous scientific difficulties associated with creating legally meaningful causal
links between dispersed nonpoint sources, their control activities, and changes in surface
water pollutant loadings. The causal linkages are poorly understood and even when
developed in the most rigorous manner only apply to the watershed for which they were
specifically developed. The complex and idiosyncratic nature of pollutant discharge,
transport, and deposition processes means that the technical underpinnings of TMDLs
will be costly.
Administrative costs, together with resistance from currently unregulated sources,
will act as a brake on state efforts to propose bold new approaches to control activities.
While water-quality-based regulation gives point sources an incentive to lobby for
nonpoint controls, organized nonpoint interests will undoubtedly continue to resist
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control requirements. Federal authority to compel, and funding to entice, nonpoint
controls is limited. The central role of state law and location-specific political conditions
mean that TMDL implementation will vary across states. Several issues demand greater
legal clarity. Interjurisdictional conflict is likely, since downstream jurisdictions will
often inherit upstream water quality problems. Air deposition will present particularly
knotty jurisdictional issues. The federal role in resolving these inevitable conflicts
deserves attention. Also, the relationship between water quantity allocations and water
quality will demand a reconciliation between state quantity and quality laws.
Finally, the rules’ emphasis on trading among point sources and nonpoint sources
should be viewed as a desirable aspiration, but also as a distraction in the near term.
Significant administrative, monitoring, and enforcement barriers to water quality trading
exist. The best direct evidence of these barriers is that trading simply between point
sources has failed to be practical. Expansion of trading programs to nonpoint sources
significantly expands their complexity. Point-point source trading is a challenge that
should be met well before point-nonpoint or nonpoint-nonpoint trading is attempted on a
large scale. One of the many preconditions for trading is that nonpoint sources be
monitorable and that enforcement mechanisms exist to compel corrective actions when
discharge restrictions are violated. Regulatory, legal, and technical efforts should first be
directed toward this goal, which is in itself a significant challenge.